Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices by John G. Cragg & Burton G. Malkiel
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices
Volume Author/Editor: John G. Cragg and Burton G. Malkiel




Chapter Title: Empirical Connection of the Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
Models
Chapter Author: John G. Cragg, Burton G. Malkiel
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11291




We suggested in chapter 3 that a relationship should exist between the
earnings growth expectations we have collected and the market values of
the corresponding shares. The present chapter reports on our empirical
investigation of this relationship. This investigation may be regarded in
one of two ways. Assuming that growth-rate expectations are a major
input used by investors to form expected security returns, our empirical
work tests the validity of the valuation models. Conversely, if we main-
tain the validity of the valuation models, we may be regarded as testing
the hypothesis that earnings growth expectations do play a major role,
along with the other specified variables, in investors' evaluations of
expected security returns.
We begin by investigating the expected rate of return measure sug-
gested by equation (3.3-14) and obtained by using the averages of the
long-term expected growth rates. We are particularly concerned with
whether the relationship between expected return and the systematic risk
variables represented by various regression coefficients holds when ex-
pected return is measured with our analysts' forecasts. First, in section
4.1 we specify more precisely exactly what measures of risk will be
employed. Next, in section 4.2, we examine the prima facie evidence in
favor of hypotheses suggested by the diversification model. Section 4.3
then adopts a more structural approach, which takes into account some
econometric problems that were discussed in section 3.4. We switch in
section 4.4 to the alternative specification (3.3-15), which we suggested
might also give a good representation of the model. This price-earnings
ratio formulation allows us to enquire whether other growth forecasts
might give a closer explanation of valuation relationships than the ex-
pectations data we collected. Failure to find such improvement allows us
to conclude that our growth measures are closest to the actual expecta-
tions that enter market valuation.
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Having a model for prices also allows us to investigate whether knowl-
edge of the model and access to the expectations data would have allowed
superior stock selection. The fact that they would not comes as no
surprise, but the reasons are of considerable interest. These are the
subject of section 4.5. The various findings of these investigations are
summarized in section 4.6.
4.1 The Risk Measures Used
It is not clear from the diversification model exactly what measures of
risk would be most appropriate. We did provide, in section 3.4, a theoret-
ical justification for the general approach that we shall take. Neverthe-
less, some empirical investigation is needed before we can ascertain what
specific measures are most appropriate; that is, we need to select the
exact form of the regression equation whose estimated coefficients will
stand for the factor coefficients. We begin by exploring relationships
between security returns and some economic variables that are of interest
whatever valuation model is appropriate. Once we have established the
variables to be used, we proceed to explore the valuation relationships
suggested by the theory.
The first set of variables employed are measures of so-called market
risk derived from the regressions of the realized rates of return on various
market-wide variables.
1 We experimented with several market indicators
including the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index, the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average (of 30 stocks), and the (value) weighted and unweighted
indexes made available by the University of Chicago's Center for Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP). The realized rates of return were
obtained from the CRSP. Our results turned out not to be sensitive to use
of the alternative market indexes, so we report here only the results for
the CRSP weighted index. This index tended to give results as strong as
any in terms of r
2 for the regressions of company returns on the index and
provided coefficients which were marginally stronger for the subsequent
simple regressions reported in section 4.2.
Correlation with other types of variables may also yield needed risk
measures whether the extended CAPM (involving nonmarketable in-
come streams) or the diversification model is assumed. We selected three
such additional variables. They are the rate of change of National Income
(NI), the short-term interest rate measured by the ninety-day Treasury
Bill rate, and the rate of inflation measured by the increase of the
Consumer Price Index.
2 These may be considered typical measures of
1. These are the "beta" coefficients often calculated allegedly to give content to the
CAPM.
2. We used alternatively the rate of change of GNP as opposed to NI; the long rate as
opposed to the short; and the GNP deflator as opposed to the CPI. The alternative series
were so highly correlated that it made little difference which we employed.137 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
some risks to which investors are subject, stemming from variation in
other sources of income, from changes in interest rates, and from changes
in inflation.
The period over which the regression coefficients should be calculated
is not clear a priori. It is not even clear that only past values should be
used. The theory involves the covariances of returns with various quanti-
ties in the future. These parameters could safely be estimated from past
data if they did not change or if investors did not perceive change. Such
stability is unlikely. Changes in the nature and type of activities that
corporations pursue and alterations in the structure of the economy make
it likely that the appropriate regression coefficients change through time.
Insofar as investors can perceive and even anticipate these changes, they
are unlikely simply to extrapolate past betas into the future. Indeed,
many of the popular "beta services" in the financial community explicitly
adjust the betas calculated from past data, on the basis of changes that are
known to have occurred in the structure of the business. Thus, in calculat-
ing the relevant betas at any time, it might be sensible to use values
estimated with data following the time at which the valuation took place.
Fortunately, our expectations data are not based on calculations using the
realizations over the forecast period so we do not have to worry about
spurious correlations being found between the expected return and these
future values.
We adopted a compromise approach after some experimentation. The
regression coefficients are calculated using quarterly observations over
ten-year periods. The periods used covered the three years prior to the
valuation date and the seven years following it. The results reported in
the next section are not very sensitive to variations in the details of this
procedure. Almost the same results were obtained, for example, when
we took five years before and after the valuation date. Nevertheless, we
did find that use of data entirely from past periods gave less satisfactory
results than those obtained by including some future data. Extending the
estimation period into the future improved the values of r
2 and was
particularly important for obtaining some precision in evaluating the
effect of inflation.
We also tried monthly rather than quarterly observations and shorter
time periods over which to make the calculations of covariances with the
market index. Again we found that the results improved when future data
were included in the calculations, i.e., when some foresight regarding the
future was assumed. However, the use of the shorter period made no
substantial difference to the results. Since it is desirable to calculate all
the regression coefficients over the same period so that the variance-
covariance matrices of these estimates can be easily obtained for use in
testing certain hypotheses, and since National Income is available only
quarterly, we pursued the quarterly calculations.138 Chapter Four
4.2 Association of Expected Return and Risk
4.2.1 Strength of Individual Measures
The first question we investigate is the relationship between expected
return and each of the various risk measures. The critical questions are
whether the regression coefficients specified in the previous section are
related to expected return and whether other types of risk measures (not
suggested by the CAPM) are more important.
The expected return variable we use is suggested by equation (3.3-14).
Let gjt be the average of the long-term predicted (percentage) rates of
growth available for company; at time t, Djt+1 be the dividends expected
to be paid per share in the course of the next year (as estimated by the
predictor which furnished data in all years), and PJt be the end-of-year
closing price (ex dividend where appropriate) for the shares of company
;'. Then the expected percentage rate of return, py,, is calculated as
(4.2-1) pjt = gjt+100(Djt+1/Pjt).
Simple regressions of this expected return measure on the various risk
proxies are summarized in table 4.1. The sort of cross-sectional data we
are using makes us vulnerable to heteroscedasticity, which can produce
some seriously misleading results from our data if the problem is ignored.
To avoid the difficulties produced by heteroscedasticity, we calculated
the standard errors of the coefficients in the way advocated by White
(1980) that allows for any heteroscedasticity that may be present. We
report in table 4.1 the asymptotic t-values for the regression coefficients
calculated in this way. Because of the adjustment for heteroscedasticity,
the coefficient of determination r
2 is not a monotonic transformation of
these ^-values. The values of r
2 did nevertheless tend to parallel the
^-values.
The first risk measure is the regression coefficient of the (excess) rate of
return of each security on the (excess) rate of return to the CRSP
value-weighted market index. It is denoted by (3My and was obtained by
estimating the equation
(4.2-2) itjt - p, = (3M;(TTM, - p,) + ujt
for each company; over forty quarters, that is, forty values of t. Here IT,, is
the ex post return to company;, p, is the short-term (ninety-day) Treasury
Bill rate taken to represent the risk-free rate of interest, and TTM( is the
rate of return of the CRSP index. This pMy coefficient is, of course, the
measure suggested by the CAPM if one ignores the problem that the
market index must provide complete coverage of marketable securities.
We then proceed to estimate the equation
(4.2-3) pjt = a0 + ax pMy + vJt.139 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
Table 4.1 Risk Measures and Naive Expected Return (asymptotic /-values
adjusted for heteroscedasticity)
A. Using Regression Coefficients





















































































$M = coefficient of the CRSP value weighted index.
py = coefficient of the rate of change of National Income.
pr = coefficient of the Treasury Bill rate.
Pp = coefficient of the rate of change of prices.
s
2g = variance of the long-term growth predictions.
sg = standard deviations of the long-term growth predictions.
se = standard error of regression of return on four variables.
Sj = variance of the short-term growth predictions.
This equation is estimated separately for each year t on the basis of all
companies j for which we had data in that year. The resulting t-values for
ax appear in table 4.1.
The ^-values obtained from estimating equation (4.2-3) are positive and
usually significant. The strength of the association is not great, however:
the value of r
2 corresponding to the highest t-value is only 0.16. The
weakness of these associations could arise from the particular market
index and periods used. However, as noted above, the results did not
vary substantially if alternative indexes were used in place of the CRSP
weighted index, and seemed more apt to be weaker than stronger. They
also were not substantially changed by using the coefficient obtained by
regressing individual returns on the market return rather than using
excess returns in each case. Moreover, the results were not very sensitive140 Chapter Four
to changing the period over which the coefficients were estimated, pro-
vided that at least some observations following the date at which the
growth forecasts were made were included.
Although the regression coefficients with the CRSP index give signifi-
cant results, strong t-values (and coefficients of determination) are some-
times obtained from using the regression coefficients of the securities'
returns on the rate of change of National Income, indicated by py in table
4.1, in place of (SM in estimating equation (4.2-3). These t-values are not,
however, as strong as those for the coefficient of the CRSP index.
Our next risk measures come from estimating the regression of each
security's rate of return on the rate of inflation ((3p) and on the Treasury
Bill rate ((3r). Systematic relationships between security returns and
inflation and interest rates are consistent with the wider specification of
returns being associated with a variety of factors, as we argued in chapter
3. Table 4.1 indicates that these alternative risk measures do not do as
well as the standard (3M measure during the early years. They do, how-
ever, tend to have a much stronger influence later in the 1960s when
inflation rates and interest rates begin to soar. The signs of (3r and (3p can
be expected to be negative if they do not also stand as proxies for other
risk measures. A higher value of pp indicates that a stock provides a
better inflation hedge, which is a desirable attribute. Similarly, a positive
value of pr indicates that the stock does well when interest rates rise and
hence is negatively correlated with realized returns from fixed income
securities.
These results clearly indicate that the various regression coefficients
are indeed related to expected return. The next question is whether other
types of risk measure have still closer associations. Part B of table 4.1
summarizes the results obtained by using various variance measures for
risk instead of regression coefficients.
The first of these alternative risk measures is the variance of the
predictions of long-term growth, s
2. This quantity may possibly be inter-
preted as a measure of own variance and thus of specific risk. Neverthe-
less, the decomposition shown in equation (3.4-14) suggests that it may
instead be a particularly good expectational proxy for systematic risk. For
the years 1962 through 1965, when our sample was widest, s
2 gives
stronger results than any of the regression risk measures. It also shows
positive associations with expected rates of return in other years, which
are clearly significant except in 1961.
Equation (3.4-14), which provides the basis for the possible interpreta-
tion of s
2 as representing systematic risk, also indicates that s
2g would be a
quadratic rather than a linear combination of the factor coefficients *yjk.
This might suggest that the standard deviations of growth forecasts might
be stronger measures of systematic risk than the variances. However, as
the column of table 4.1 headed sg shows, there was no reliable tendency
for this to be the case.141 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
If s
2g should represent specific risk rather than systematic risk, one
might expect a better measure to be provided by the residual variances or
standard errors of estimate of the regressions of the rates of return on the
various systematic variables. Our findings do not, however, support this
supposition. The standard errors from the regression of return on the
four variables used to calculate the (3 coefficients produced weaker results
than did s
2g. They are shown in the column of table 4.1 headed se. The
residual variances, that is, s
2e, gave no stronger results.
The success of the variance of the long-term predictors makes one
wonder whether the variance of the short-term growth predictions could
also be used to provide a useful measure. This did not prove to be the
case. The results, given in the final column of table 4.1, show mixed signs
and are generally not significant. This risk measure quite clearly is weaker
than the variance of the long-term predictions.
4.2.2 Use of Several Risk Measures
These results already have some interesting implications despite the
simplistic approach used. There is, however, no reason to limit ourselves
to only one risk measure. We now turn to the wider specification where in
the first step the realized rate of return is regressed on all the suggested
variables.
3 Before looking in the next section at the more structural
aspects of this specification, we examine the prima facie case that all these
variables are relevant to valuation, even though these inferences may
turn out to be influenced by errors-in-variables difficulties.
The coefficients were obtained from the multiple regression of the rate
of return of each security on the CRSP value-weighted index (M), on the
rate of change of National Income (DY), on the Treasury Bill rate (r),
and on the rate of inflation (DP). The equation fitted for each company is
(4.2-4) ir;, = 50; + hMjMt + hYjDYt
and the estimated regression coefficient 8^ serves as risk measures. The
cross-section specification for pJt is expanded from (4.2-3) to
(4.2-5) pjt = a0 + axhMj + a2hYj + a3hrJ + a4hpj. Estimates of this equation are given in table 4.2.
A number of findings indicated by table 4.2 are worth emphasizing. Of
most importance, each type of coefficient is significant in some years. In
the first part of the period only the market coefficient is significant.
However, toward the end of the period other coefficients tend to be
important, especially those measuring systematic relationships with infla-
tion and interest rates. When these results are taken at face value, two
3. These are the regressions from which the standard errors of estimate referred to in
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explanations for them come to mind. First, in the more stable early part
of the period, estimates of the 8 coefficients may be sufficiently imprecise
that in the subsequent estimation of equation (4.2-5) the relatively
greater errors of measurement lead to lack of significance. Second,
investors may have become more concerned about the other sources of
risk, such as inflation and interest-rate instability, as the decade
proceeded.
4 Overall, the results suggest strongly that all influences play a
role, though it is an open question whether this is because they act as
proxies for other variables.
The signs of the coefficients tend to be the same across the different
equations. Although with errors in variables we must be cautious in
attaching much importance to the signs of particular coefficients, the
patterns obtained do usually conform to the signs suggested by intuition.
Positive association with either the market return or income raises the
expected rate of return. Correspondingly, positive partial correlation
with the rate of inflation, indicating that the stock tends to act as a hedge
against inflation, lowers the expected rate of return. Finally, the coef-
ficient for the Treasury Bill rate usually has the expected negative sign.
There is, however, a good deal of correlation across securities (roughly
about 0.6) between the coefficients for the Treasury Bill rate and for the
rate of inflation so that one may be partly serving as an additional proxy
for the other. This correlation is sufficiently low, however, that one
cannot legitimately presume that variations in the rate of change of prices
and in the short-term rate of interest necessarily represent the same
4. Inflation, as measured by the annual rate of change in the Consumer Price Index,
remained below the 2 percent level through 1965. Later in the decade, inflation increased to
the 6 percent level.143 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
variable. Except for this fairly mild correlation, multicollinearity prob-
lems are small, making it less plausible that all the different measures
serve as proxies for some single variable.
Inclusion of all these different regression coefficients does not account
for the strength we found earlier for the variance of the predictions.
When that variable was included in (4.2-5) along with the four 8 variables
measuring various systematic risks, it usually was highly significant with a
positive coefficient. The a coefficients for the four 6 variables tended to
retain the same signs, though with lessened significance. The apparent
importance of s
2 may in part result from errors-in-variables problems or
misspecification. Nevertheless, it may also indicate that sg is a particularly
useful expectational proxy for several of the systematic risk measures.
What is important is that the values of R
 2 are sufficiently high and so very
highly significant that there is no question about there being some under-
lying systematic association among the variables included in the specifica-
tion.
4.3 Structural Relations between Expected Return
and Risk Coefficients
The results reported in the previous section may arise because the
market actually takes a multifaceted approach to risk. In contrast, they
may simply be the outcome of using poor data. To investigate this
question, we proceed in two stages. First, we examine the extent to which
our risk coefficients exhibit the linear structure that we indicated in
section 3.4 would be found if there were fewer factors than the number of
independent variables used in the regressions in which the 8, coefficients
were calculated. Establishment of the number of factor coefficients is also
needed in order to proceed to take account of the errors of estimation of
the 8 coefficients. The second stage involves estimating the valuation
model allowing for the presence of these errors.
4.3.1 The Number of Factor Coefficients
We showed in equation (3.4-12) that the variance-covariance matrix of
the regression coefficients has a particular structure under the common-
factor model for rates of return. Let 6 be the average of the 6; vectors, and
let a be the average of the ay vectors whose elements ajk are the coef-
ficients of the common K factors in the (true) rate-of-return equation
(3.2-16). Letting h = '%j=1hj/J, where hj is the residual variance, we can
rewrite equation (3.4-12) as
(4.3-1) ^
=£f? (Sy-8)(6;-8)7/1
= H'f X^oLj - a)(aj - 5)7/1 B + h(X'X)-\144
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Significance Levels for the Hypothesis That More Than Specified
Numbers of Factors Are Present in the Regression Coefficients
Number of Factors
Years 0 12 3
1959-68 .000 .816 .594 .174
1960-69 .000 .134 .266 .126
1961-70 .000 .890 .784 .303
1962-71 .000 .935 .839 .951
1963-72 .000 .767 .789 .305
1964-73 .000 .001 .059 .694
1965-74 .000 .068 .196 .992
1966-75 .000 .005 .065 .398
1967-76 .000 .006 .053 .317
Since (X'X), the cross-product matrix of the variables used to estimate
the coefficients, is known,
5 we can investigate the hypothesis that this
common-factor structure does apply
6 to the variance-covariance matrix
of the estimated coefficients calculated for the different companies.
Assuming that the coefficients are normally distributed across com-
panies, we performed likelihood-ratio tests of a variety of hypotheses. In
doing so we used the value of Ji, the average of the estimates coming from
the estimates of the individual regressions, rather than jointly estimating
this parameter in thejactor analysis. No substantial differences in results
occur when instead h is estimated from the 5 data.
The regression coefficients used for different years are far from being
independent, since thirty-six of the quarterly observations are the same in
regressions for adjacent years. Nevertheless, the patterns that occur over
time are of interest. When we tested the hypothesis that there are less
than four factors represented by the four regression coefficients, the data
strongly supported the hypothesis that there are fewer factors. These
tests are summarized in table 4.3 in terms of the smallest significance
levels at which one could reject the (null) hypothesis of only zero, one,
two, and three factors over the alternative hypothesis of at least four
different factors being present.
7
The hypothesis of only one factor is very strongly indicated in the early
part of the period. However, when observations from the 1970s begin to
5. Of course, when the 8 vector being investigated does not contain the constant term,
the appropriate row and column are first removed from (X'X)'
1.
6. Specifically, the procedure involves the principal components of 2/=i (8y — 8)
(8, - 8)77 in the metric of (X'X)'
1. See Anderson and Rubin (1956) for a discussion of
maximum likelihood estimates of the model. The fact that Ji(X'X) ~
x is known makes more
factors identifiable than would usually be the case.
7. Qualitatively similar results are obtained when we test three versus four factors, two
versus three, etc.145 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
play an important part, the data indicate that at least two factors are
present and would reject at the 0.10 level the hypothesis of two factors in
favor of three factors for some of the estimations.
The reason for the success of a one common-factor model in the early
estimates was not that the correlations of different quantities, which
themselves all varied significantly, could be fully attributed to a single
factor. Rather, it was the case that some of the estimated coefficients
varied so little across companies, relative to their errors of estimation,
that both the variances across companies of their true values, 8//t, and
their correlations with other coefficients could be treated as zero.
This problem is illustrated by the data from the 1960s shown in table




(8, - 8)(8; - 8)7/ - h{X'X)
All the variances of the 8r and 8p coefficients can be attributed to estima-
tion errors, and the hypothesis that the variance across companies in the
true coefficients was zero could not be rejected. Indeed, all the variance
can be so attributed for bp, the coefficients of inflation. Later, as interest
rates and inflation rates themselves showed more variation, this ceased to
be the case and all coefficients showed variation across companies sig-
nificant beyond the 0.05 level. As noted earlier, while short-term interest
rates and inflation may primarily reflect the same factor (as might be the
case if the real rate of interest is constant), the magnitude of measure-
ment errors in each variable must then be very substantial since collinear-
ity problems in the data were mild and do not clearly account for the
Table 4.4 Covariance Matrices of the Regression Coefficients
Fitted for 1960-69




br .47 -3.78 58.9
bp -.03 1.27 -22.9 19.3
B. After Subtraction of Estimation Error
bM .05
by .13 1.08
br .61 1.63 5.13
L -.28 -1.21 4.73 -4.25146 Chapter Four
difficulties. Furthermore, the results about the number of factors were
repeated when we dropped the interest-rate variable from the original
regressions. The 1964-73 period and later ones indicated the presence of
at least two and possibly three factors. Prior to that period, the variance-
covariance matrices suggest only a single factor.
Earlier investigations of the appropriateness of the common-factor
model to security returns suggested that several factors would be found.
King (1966) as well as Roll and Ross (1980) each found support for such a
hypothesis. Hence one may suspect that our results for the early years
reflect the peculiarities of the data on some of the independent variables
in that period.
These tests have involved the variance-covariance matrices of the
regression coefficients. This was appropriate in view of our desire to use
the adjusted matrices subsequently in estimation where it is necessary to
avoid using singular matrices. However, the original hypothesis applies
also to the averages (across companies) of the coefficients, that is, to
When we investigated the number of factors, recognizing that the means
of the regression coefficients should have the same factor structure, we
found evidence for two factors rather than only one in the early years.
That is, the hypothesis of only one factor can be rejected well beyond the
0.05 level, but not that of there being only two factors. The results for the
later years did not change appreciably. We can still conclude that there
are certainly two, and possibly three, common factors.
4.3.2 Results Allowing for Estimation Error
The previous findings about the number of factor coefficients present in
the rate of return regressions pose a dilemma for the next part of our
investigation. We suspect that the reason for finding only one factor in the
early years is that the other factors happened to have very little variation
in the 1960s. However, if the risk was still present that they would vary,
then their coefficients should still enter the valuation equation. Using a
one-factor model would then involve misspecification. Testing the
hypothesis that more than one factor is actually present does require that
the data clearly involve more than one factor. A procedure developed in
Cragg (1982) that allows for estimation errors in 8 involves the use of
Xfi - 8)(8y - 8)7/ - h{X'X)-
l\-\
The procedure makes sense only if the matrix is clearly positive definite.
When this is the case, we can allow for the estimation error to see what
inferences stand up even when its effects are recognized. In doing so, we147 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
shall use the simplification, discussed in Cragg (1982), in which the ujt of
equation (4.2-4) are assumed to be normally distributed.
We resolve the dilemma posed by our findings about the structure of
the hj coefficients by fitting two types of model, allowing in each case for
the estimation errors of the regression coefficients. First, we estimate the
equations for the expected rate of return using only the regression coef-
ficient for the market and the variance of the long-term predictors; i.e.,
we fit the equation
(4.3-2) p,, = ao + a$Mj + a2s
2gj.
Here, the pMy are based on the three years before and the seven years
after the valuation. Second, we use the coefficients for the 1966-75
period, estimated without the interest-rate variable; that is, we estimate
(4.3-3) py, = bo + b^Mj + b2iYj + b3ypj + b4s
2gj,
where the 7,- are calculated from the regression
(4.3-4) TTjt = 7o; + IMJ^M + IYJDY + ypjDP + vjt
for the period 1966-75. As we noted, there 7 coefficients do support
(though not strongly) the conclusion that a three-factor model is
appropriate.
The first approach does little to resolve the puzzle. In the early part of
the period, |3M was not significant while sg was always stronger and
usually significant. For 1966 and subsequent years, when the number of
predictors available on which to base s
2 becomes small, $M is highly
significant, and positive, as is sg in the last two years. These results suggest
that sg is not simply another proxy for the systematic risk measured with
considerable estimation error by (3M. Instead, it suggests that a model
with two or more factors is appropriate—or that there is another relevant
risk concept proxied by sg.
The results of the second approach shed quite a bit more light on the
matter. When adjustment was made for errors in variables and allowance
was made for heteroscedasticity, it usually turned out that none of the
coefficients was significantly different from zero. At best, but one would
be, and then only just at the 0.05 level. This was true whether sg was
included or not. Overall, however, when sg was included in the equation,
the hypothesis that all -yy parameters had zero coefficients in equation
(4.3-3) could be rejected beyond the 0.01 level, except in 1963 and 1965.
When sg was not included, the hypothesis could sometimes be rejected at
the 0.10 level and sometimes not.
Part of the difficulty stems from multicollinearity. As lack of certainty
about the number of underlying factors indicated, the "corrected" 7,
coefficients are correlated with each other. Moreover, there is some
correlation with s
2g, though it is small. The technique used involves much148 Chapter Four
more complicated standard errors than ordinary regression, and for a
given covariance matrix of explanatory variables these standard errors
are considerably larger. More coherent results were obtained when the
7y coefficient for National Income was eliminated from (4.3-3). A pattern
then emerged in which the coefficient of inflation and the variance of the
predictors were significant, but the coefficient for the market index was
not. Eliminating this coefficient as well as the one for national income
then produced the results shown in table 4.5.
The results shown in table 4.5 are similar in nature for the different
years. The risk variable s
2g has a positive and usually significant effect. The
notable change in its magnitude in 1966 corresponds to the change in the
number of predictors from which the forecast data were collected. The
sensitivity of the security's rate of return to the rate of inflation as
measured by yp had a negative effect as we would expect.
These results suggest that at least two factors are relevant in valuation.
One may be equated broadly to inflation and its associated effects. The
other, possibly representing market risk, seems to be better represented
by the variance of the predictions of long-term growth than by any of the
regression coefficients. Its exact nature therefore remains a bit of a
puzzle. The first factor has a negative sign and is usually significant at the
0.10 level. This was true even in the early years when the experienced
variations in the inflation rate were very small. The second factor is very
strongly positive and highly significant.
Table 4.5 Equation for Expected Rates of Return Allowing for Estimation
Error in yt (asymptotic f-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity)
Year Constant yp s
2g «r2»* rj
1961 9.26 -1.13 .63 .56 —
(12.62) (-1.72) (6.30)
1962 8.40 -.46 .67 .38 .88
(30.87) (-1.70) (4.96)
1963 8.18 -.61 .72 .34 .89
(32.30) (-1.58) (2.98)
1964 8.55 -.74 .63 .54 .84
(21.17) (-1.92) (18.77)
1965 9.01 -.74 .62 .61 .90
(24.20) (-1.99) (29.39)
1966 10.72 -.20 .05 .08 .68
(28.48) (-.73) (1.48)
1967 11.35 -.53 .03 .25 .67
(24.88) (-1.65) (2.05)
1968 11.93 -.75 .05 .70 .48
(17.74) (-1.82) (7.44)
*"r
2" is 1 - (estimated residual variance)/(variance of p;,).
V£ is correlation of residuals with previous year's residuals.149 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
These results have been corrected for the errors of measurement in the
regression coefficients, but errors in s
2 have been ignored. The inter-
pretation we have been giving to that variable means that we cannot
calculate the variance of errors in its measurement by assuming that it is
simply the sampling variance of predictions which all have the same mean
for each firm. We did, however, attempt to deal with this measurement
error by the use of instrumental variables while continuing to allow for
the estimation errors in the regression coefficients. To do so, we used as
instruments the regression coefficients ^M and yY
 and the residual
variances s
2, whose usefulness we explored earlier, in table 4.1.
The main difficulty with the instrumental-variable approach in this case
was that the proposed instruments are not closely associated with s
2g. The
value of R
2 obtained from regressing s
2 on all the instruments and yp
varied from 0.05 to 0.31. The main effect of this weakness on the esti-
mates of the equations for expected return was to reduce the standard
errors of the coefficients of s
2 sharply. These findings strengthen the
impression that s
2 contains relevant information about risk not readily
available in other forms. However, the significance levels of *yp were not
affected by the use of instrumental variables, and the results were qualita-
tively much the same as those shown in table 4.5 in terms of the signs and
magnitudes of the coefficients.
4.3.3 Constancy over Time
One of the interesting questions about valuation equations is whether
the coefficients remain the same each year or whether they change. There
is nothing in the valuation theory to suggest that they should be constant.
The opportunity sets faced by investors, extending beyond simply the
financial securities available to them, probably change and so may their
preferences and concerns about various types of risk. The results of tables
4.2 and 4.5 give an impression of considerable variation. We now test for
variability explicitly.
The residuals from the equations shown in table 4.5 for different years
are correlated even after allowance is made for the effects of estimation
errors of yp. Problems of missing observations mean that we can simul-
taneously calculate the equations for a common set of companies in all
years only at the expense of losing a large number of companies. Pairwise
comparisons indicated that the residuals for adjacent years are quite
highly correlated. The correlations of these residuals are recorded in
table 4.5 in the column headed r€. It gives the correlations of the residuals
in one year with those of the year immediately preceding. The quantities
tabulated are the correlations of residuals using a common set of com-
panies to estimate the regression coefficients in the two years. The exact
values of the coefficients used differ slightly from those shown in table 4.5
because of the reduced number of observations used in their calculation.150 Chapter Four
The correlations of residuals, which are highly significant, complicate
the problem of inquiring into the stability of the regression coefficients
over time. Zellner's (1962) "seemingly unrelated regression technique"
can be adapted in a straightforward way to the estimation of our equa-
tions even when allowing for estimation error of the original regression
coefficients as well as for heteroscedasticity. To avoid the extensive loss
of observations involved when all equations are fitted simultaneously,
only pairs of equations were fitted.
Pairwise estimation of the equations usually produced significant dif-
ferences in the coefficients of the valuation equation for different years.
The main exceptions, where rejection did not occur even at the 0.10 level,
are the 1964-65 comparison and the 1962-63 one. The coefficient for 1963
did differ from that for 1964 significantly at the 0.01 level even though the
values shown in table 4.5 indicate the same qualitative findings in the
sense that the coefficients are of similar magnitude.
The different estimation procedure used in these tests, which involve
estimating the coefficients of each of two years jointly, did not change the
conclusions about risk that were derived from our regressions in section
4.3.2 for the individual years. Indeed, these estimates indicated stronger
support than the ones in table 4.5 for the hypothesis that two types of risk
measures are indicated by the data.
4.3.4 Average Realized Return and Risk
The constant term 80; obtained when equation (4.2-4) was fitted to
obtain the other 8 coefficient contains implicitly another estimate of the
expected rate of return. It is the average rate of return realized over the
period, which many empirical studies of valuation presume corresponds
to the return expected ex ante by investors. We can use this estimate to
investigate the ex post validity of the APT, or diversification model,
which suggests that we should find the same number of factors in the 8;
vector when SQ, is included as when it is not. This consideration induces us
to repeat the investigations carried out in section 4.3.1 with the other
coefficients, but now including the constant 8Oy as well.
8
The estimates for the earlier periods included in our investigation tend
to confirm the model fully in the sense that exactly the same number of
factors is significantly present in the covariance matrix including the
constant as we found when only the regression coefficients were used.
This support for the model is less than might appear to be the case,
however. As was the case for some of the coefficients, significant varia-
tion across companies was not present in the average rates of return in the
8. All independent variables are measured as deviations from their averages, so the
constant term is also the average quarterly rate of return in the period over which the
regression coefficients are calculated.151 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
early years. In the final two years, the wider covariance matrix indicated
that at least five factors were needed to account for the covariances of the
constants with the other coefficients.
With the companies altering their natures over time and with the
market valuation of risk quite possibly changing substantially over the
decade of the seventies, such a finding should not be surprising even if the
common-factor model is a correct description of security returns. How-
ever, it does not seem feasible to use these "objective," ex post measures
of returns to obtain comparisons with the very successful results obtained
from the ex ante measures we have employed. These estimated average
ex post returns are not closely correlated with the ex ante measures
derived from using the long-term growth predictions. The strong and
interesting results we have obtained with these ex ante measures of
expected returns and the fact that the ex post ones are not closely related
to them emphasize the importance of using genuinely ex ante expecta-
tions of returns for studying security valuation.
4.4 An Alternative Valuation Specification
The derivation of the valuation model in chapter 3 suggested that the
expected return formulation we have been investigating is only one
approximation to the underlying model and that an alternative model
may also be usefully estimated. The alternative approximation produces
a more traditional formulation in which the price-earnings ratio is the
dependent variable and earnings (dividend) growth, the payout ratio,
and our various risk measures are treated as explanatory variables. The
expected return formulation is particularly convenient for focusing on the
risk structure suggested by the diversification model. The alternative
allows us to ask whether growth-rate expectations are more relevant for
valuation than other measures. It also allows us to investigate the role of
the short-term growth predictions as well as to examine again which risk
measures appear to be strongest.
An empirical analysis of the price-earnings model is also desirable
because of an ambiguity of interpretation of the expected return models
we have been studying. The results of the return model indicate partly
that predicted earnings growth is connected with the regression coef-
ficients giving the associations of rates of return to various economic
indicators. Recall, however, that we found evidence in chapter 2 that a
common-factor model may fit the growth predictions of security analysts.
Our findings for the expected rates of return may reflect this feature of the
data, even though the expected rate of return includes the dividend yield
as well as the expected growth rate. Thus it is not entirely clear that we
have actually been investigating a valuation relationship.
Implementation of the alternative model involved dividing both end-152 Chapter Four
Table 4.6 Risk Measures in Stock Price Regressions (asymptotic /-values
for alternative risk variables in equation [4.4-1])





























































of-year prices (P) and the dividends projected to be paid (D) by average
normalized earnings
9 (NE) to give the equation
(4.4-1) PINE = ao + a{gp + a2D/NE + a3RISK,
where RISK stands for the various risk variables used.
4.4.1 Risk Measures
We begin our investigation of equation (4.4-1) by treating each of the
risk measures we have been using as alternatives, just as we did when
considering equation (4.2-1). In these regressions, both the average
expected five-year growth rate and the dividend payout ratio almost
always had positive and significant coefficients throughout the sample
period.
The pattern for the risk measures is more complicated than earlier.
Table 4.6 corresponds to table 4.1. In these regressions, a negative sign
should be expected for the risk measures based on covariance with the
market index and with national income, since higher risk should, ceteris
paribus, lower price-earnings multiples. Although both p measures have
the correct negative values more often than not, the t-values indicate that
they are only occasionally significant. Positive signs should be expected
for the risk measures based on reported inflation and interest rates. As
was found in the regressions in table 4.1, these risk measures are only
significant toward the end of the period studied, but their signs are often
incorrect in these valuation regressions.
These findings indicate the difficulties of using the simple regression
coefficients as risk measures in a specification also containing several
other variables. In contrast to these ambiguous results, the variance of
9. The "normalized" earnings were furnished by two of the forecasters and were
described in chapter 1. When more than one forecaster's estimates of "normalized"
earnings were available for a company, the estimates were averaged. The results are little
different (but a bit poorer) if reported earnings over the most recent twelve-month period
are substituted for "normalized" earnings.153 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
Table 4.7 PINE Regression Estimates of Equation (4.4-1) (asymptotic /-ratios
adjusted for heteroscedasticity)
Year Constant gp DINE s
2g R
2
1961 1.88 3.91 1.22 -.57 .81
(.64) (7.51) (.24) (-.41)
1962 3.30 2.23 8.41 -1.17 .75
(1.75) (16.69) (2.91) (-5.79)
1963 2.85 2.70 6.71 -.59 .77
(.94) (11.20) (1.75) (-2.37)
1964 2.53 2.15 13.16 -1.09 .77
(1.73) (23.94) (6.13) (-9.71)
1965 1.76 2.82 4.73 -.66 .67
(.62) (6.98) (1.14) (-1.24)
1966 .22 1.74 7.42 -.01 .57
(.09) (9.62) (2.79) (-.19)
1967 1.88 2.35 -1.05 -.09 .69
(.67) (13.28) (-.35) (-8.67)
1968 2.18 1.78 5.13 -.04 .52
(.56) (8.10) (.99) (-1.12)
the predictions always has a negative sign. Its significance does vary
considerably across years, primarily reflecting variation in the magnitude
of its coefficient. The important point, which agrees with our previous
results with the expected return measures, is that s
2g provided a better
single risk proxy than the regression coefficients based on more objective
calculations. It also provided a more significant and consistent measure
than the residual variances of the regressions, s
2e.
Table 4.7 shows the full estimates of equation (4.4-1) using s
2g as the risk
variable. The growth-rate variable is highly significant in each of the years
covered. The payout ratio has the expected sign except in one year but is
usually insignificant.
1
0 As we have already noted, the risk variable always
has the correct negative sign and is often significant.
4.4.2 Alternative Growth Measures
The extent to which using truly expectational data is important for
valuation models is indicated in table 4.8. Here we show the values of/?
2
10. The positive sign of the dividend coefficient should not be interpreted as evidence
that dividend policy can affect the value of the shares. This coefficient indicates only that a
ceteris paribus change in dividend payout will increase the price of the shares. Among the
things held constant in this equation is the growth rate of earnings and dividends per share.
A positive dividend coefficient thus indicates only that given the future growth rate in
earnings and dividends, the price of a share should be higher, the higher is the current
percentage of earnings that can be paid out. The famous "dividend irrelevancy" theorem of
Miller and Modigliani (1961) says that an increase in dividend payout will tend to reduce the
growth rate of earnings per share since new shares will now have to be sold to make up for
the extra funds paid out in dividends. A positive dividend coefficient is thus in no way
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NOTE. See text for specifications.
for various combinations of historical and expectational data. The first
specification (column 2) involved regressing the price-earnings multiple
on three historic figures: the past ten-year growth rate of cash earnings,
the average (over the preceding seven years) historic dividend-payout
rate, and $M, estimated using only previous ^data. The third column
substitutes the expectational variable s
2g for the $M coefficient. The fourth
column repeats the specification of equation (4.4-1) with s
2g as the risk
variables, gp and DINE in place of historic growth and payout, and PINE
as the dependent variable in place of PIE. These r
2 values are the same as
in table 4.7.
The dramatic change in the value of r
2 for the valuation equation occurs
when ~gp is used for the growth rate. Other variations have comparatively
minor effects. There are, of course, a large number of ways of calculating
past growth. Our findings hold up for the wide variety of historical growth
rate we tried as well as the one reported in table 4.8. Using the average
predicted growth rates substantially improves the fit of the regression. It
is therefore safe to conclude that insofar as the market does value growth,
the growth rates involved are far better represented by actual predictions
made by security analysts than by any mechanically calculated rate.
One may wonder whether we would have done better to use only one
forecaster rather than the average we have employed. Problems of miss-
ing observations again hinder this investigation. One of the advantages of
using the average is that it allows us to include most of the companies in
the regressions. However, it is also the case that closer fits tended to be
obtained by using the average growth rates of all predictors than by
employing the forecasts of any single firm. This suggests that our survey
was useful in getting closer to what might be considered the expectations
of a "representative" investor.155 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
4.4.3 Role of Short-Term Predictions
In addition to the long-term growth estimates, which have played such
an important role in our empirical valuation work thus far, we also
collected short-term predictions for earnings in the next year. These were
described and analyzed in chapters 1 and 2. Given the long-term growth
rate, a stock should sell for a higher price if more of that growth is
expected to be realized earlier in the period. Therefore we augmented
our valuation equation (4.4-1) to include the term Et+1INE, the ratio of
next year's average predicted earnings (Et+1) to average normalized
earnings (for the present period). Equation (4.4-1) then becomes
(4.4-2) P/NE = ao + axgp + a2Et+J'NE + a3D/77E + aAs\.
The results obtained with this specification are presented in table 4.9.
The addition of a term for short-term growth does add some explanatory
power to the regression, although the significant ^-statistic for the coef-
ficient of Et+1/NE comes partly at the expense of the long-term growth
coefficient. The dividend and risk terms generally retain their usual signs,
though they are often not significant.
4.4.4 Variations of Specification
The success of the short-term growth variable raises the question
whether more generally a nonlinear specification might be appropriate.
As we noted in section 3.4, the linear form of the equation is only an
approximation to some more complicated true form. To investigate this
Table 4.9 PINE Regression Estimates of Equation (4.4-2) (asymptotic








































































































possibility, we used a quadratic specification for the growth and dividend-
payout variables. That is, we added the squares of g~p and of DINE and
their cross-product to the specification (4.4-2).
Use of these nonlinear terms did little to improve the explanatory
power of the equation, though in some instances they did have significant
coefficients. Stability was found neither in which variables were signifi-
cant nor in their signs. Since undoubtedly our variables have substantial
measurement errors, these findings may well represent little more than
the problems such errors produce.
It is not surprising in view of these findings that we sometimes found
that breaking the sample into various groups produced significant differ-
ences between the groups. Thus, when the equation was run separately
for low-dividend/high-growth and high-dividend/low-growth companies,
(where the dividing lines are the medians of the variables), we did find
some significant differences in coefficients. Similarly, fitting the equation
for different industry groups produced some significant differences across
industries in the coefficients (e.g., dividends were more highly valued in
public utility companies). Since in each case the classifications tended to
reduce the variances of the independent variables, the significant differ-
ences may arise simply from the changed importance of the variances of
the measurement errors relative to the variances of the true underlying
variables.
4.4.5 Measurement and Estimation Error
Allowing for errors of estimation in calculating the regression coef-
ficients did not relieve the problems we encountered when we introduced
the risk measures (based on regression coefficients) directly in estimating
equation (4.4-1). Using either (3M or the y coefficients defined in equation
(4.3-4), whether alone or in conjunction with s
2g, produced neither stable
nor significant coefficients for these variables when they were added to
(4.4-2). It is far from clear that the reason for this finding was that such
risk terms do not also play a role in valuation; in other words, we cannot
conclude that a model with only one factor is appropriate. Instead, we
may ascribe the findings, at least partially, to multicollinearity, particu-
larly with the payout ratio. When these regression coefficients were
added to the specification, the coefficient of DINE usually became com-
pletely insignificant and it was highly correlated with the coefficients for
|3M or for the -y, coefficients. As we noted earlier, the growth variable g~p is
also somewhat correlated with these risk proxies. In this connection, it is
interesting to note that Rosenberg and Guy (1976) have suggested that
both dividend payout and growth potential are important systematic risk
variables.
Measurement errors are far from being confined to the risk variables.
Clearly our growth variables are subject to error and the payout variable157 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
also is only an approximation to what the market could perceive to be the
payout rate. These errors may account for some of the problems we have
encountered.
As was also the case when we sought instruments for sg, finding good
instruments for the growth rate and the payout variables was not easy.
We have already seen that gp contains useful information not available
from mechanically calculated growth rates. As a result, satisfactory in-
struments for it are unlikely to be found. We tried using past four- and
ten-year calculated growth rates as instruments for gp and the lagged
value of DINE for the current value of this variable. When we used the
specification (4.4-1), we also included Et+l/NE as an instrumental vari-
able. We could also take advantage of some of the correlations of risk
with growth and payout by treating -ym and -yy as additional instruments
when only -y^, and s
2g were used as risk measures.
Using instrumental variables to deal with these measurement errors
did not substantially alter our findings. What we obtained were equations
qualitatively similar to those shown in tables 4.7 and 4.9, but with much
larger standard errors for the coefficients. This finding may be taken to
indicate, at least, that errors in variables have not produced seriously
misleading results in those tables. When the problems of multicollinearity
of the growth and dividend variables with the risk ones were combined
with the complicated variances of the coefficients that were the result of
making allowance for the estimation error of the risk parameters, it is
small wonder that more precise results could not be obtained about the
precise specification of risk.
4.4.6 Stability over Time
We found earlier that the coefficients of the expected return model
varied over time. The question of the constancy of the valuation equation
is particularly interesting in the present form, where prices are the
dependent variable. Stability of the coefficients is also important to those
who wish to make practical use of valuation equations in connection with
assigned values of the independent variables to estimate the "intrinsic
worth" of a security. Furthermore, constancy of the relationship is impor-
tant if a firm is to seek to follow policies that will maximize the values of its
shares, since it will find it hard to please investors if their desires are
changing.
An inspection of tables 4.7 and 4.9 indicates that the coefficients of our
equations do change considerably from year to year, and in a manner that
is consistent with the changing standards of value in vogue at the different
times. We may illustrate this finding by the regression results of table 4.9.
At the end of 1961, "growth stocks" were in high favor, and it is not
surprising to find that the coefficient of the growth rate (3.07) is highest in
this year. During 1962, however, there was a conspicuous change in the158 Chapter Four
structure of share prices that was popularly called "the revaluation of
growth stocks." This revaluation is reflected in the decline of the growth-
rate coefficient for 1962 to 1.99. At the same time, dividend payout
became more highly valued in 1962 than it had been in 1961, the dividend
coefficient rising from -1.58 to 6.96. Nineteen sixty-two was also the
year when the coefficient of the risk measure was most strongly negative.
In order to test formally whether the coefficients of the valuation
equation were the same over time, we again had to recognize that the
residuals in different years were not independent. The correlations,
which are shown in table 4.10, are somewhat smaller than those found in
section 4.3 when we were investigating the expected rates of return, but
they are significantly different from zero. They again raise the need to use
an appropriate technique for assessing the stability of the coefficients and
the problem that calculating all the equations simultaneously for a com-
mon set of companies entails the loss of a large proportion of the observa-
tions.
Using the seemingly unrelated regression technique for a pair of years,
we could reject the hypothesis of equality of the coefficients in each pair
of years at least at the 0.01 level. When all years were considered
simultaneously, rejection occurred beyond the 0.0001 level despite the
large loss of observations. Thus it seems clear that valuation relationships
do change over time. While this finding may, of course, be due to
problems with the data being used, it certainly lends no credence to the
proposition that the parameters do not change.
4.5 Use of the Valuation Model for Security Selection
One of the most intriguing questions concerning empirical valuation
models is whether they can be used to aid investors in security selection.
The estimated valuation equation shows us, at a moment in time, the
average way in which variables, such as growth, payout, and risk, in-
fluence market price-earnings multiples. Given the value of these vari-
Table 4.10 Correlations of Residuals in Adjacent Years and
with Subsequent Returns
Residuals Residuals Residuals of (4.4-2)
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ables applicable to any specific security, we can compute an estimated
price-earnings ratio based on the empirical valuation equation. The next
step is to compare the actual price-earnings multiple with that predicted
by the valuation equation. If the actual multiple is greater than the
predicted one, we might suppose that the security is temporarily over-
priced and recommend sale. If the actual price-earnings multiple is less
than the predicted multiple, we might designate the security as tempo-
rarily underpriced and recommend its purchase.
Even on a priori grounds, it is possible to think of many reasons why
such a procedure would prove fruitless. For example, if high growth-rate
stocks tended to be overpriced during one particular period, the esti-
mated growth-rate coefficient would be larger (by assumption) than that
which is warranted. However, the recommended procedure will not
indicate that these stocks are overpriced because "normal" market-
determined earnings multiples for these securities will be higher than is
warranted. Nevertheless, in view of the popularity of these techniques
with some practitioners, it seems worthwhile to try some experiments
using our data.
The results of some of our experiments are shown in table 4.10. We
measured the degree of "over-" or "underpricing" as the predicted ratio
of the residual from the valuation equation (4.4-2) to the predicted
earnings multiple, that is, as {PINE — PINE) I {PINE). A percentage
measure was chosen in view of the considerable variance in actual earn-
ings multiples. If the model is useful in measuring underpricing, then
underpriced securities, determined according to this criterion, ought to
outperform overpriced issues over some subsequent period. We picked
one year as the appropriate horizon and measured subsequent returns in
the usual manner as
(4.5-1) Pt+1 = (Pt+1 -Pt + Dt+1)IPt.
If the empirical valuation model is successful in selecting securities for
purchase, the percentage residual (degree of overvaluation) from the
valuation equation ought to be negatively related to these subsequent
returns. As the fourth column of table 4.10 indicates, in only five of the
eight years for which this experiment was performed was the relationship
negative, and the degree of association was low. There was a positive
relationship for the other three years.
1
1 Two of these correlations are
significant at the 0.05 level: the negative one in 1963/64 and the positive
one for 1968/69. The 1961/62 correlation just misses significance at this
level. We would not consider these significant correlations as represent-
ing forecasting success. As we argue below, we suspect strongly that we
11. We were no more successful at finding wrongly priced securities using expectations
data for the individual predictors rather than the average expectations of the particular
group.160 Chapter Four
have left out some common factors and that this omission could lead to
correlations over particular periods of time. Unless one can forecast these
changes in a way not already available to the general market participant,
one can hardly exploit these changes. It is therefore particularly indica-
tive that one of the significant correlations had the "wrong" sign.
Supplementary tests conducted by the type of equation or industry and
other groupings produced similar results. For example, subsequent re-
turns were still unrelated to the residuals when we first split the sample
into high and low growth and dividend groupings. Similar results were
obtained when the experiment was attempted for separate industries. We
also found that the residuals from the equations employing historical data
in place of our expectational data were no more successful in predicting
subsequent performance. Moreover, these results were unaltered when
the subsequent returns were measured over alternative time periods such
as one-quarter ahead or two or more years ahead. The technique simply
did not produce excess returns in any consistent or reliable fashion over
any time period in the future. These findings are what we should expect in
a reasonably efficient market.
Some statistics are presented in table 4.11 that may be helpful in
interpreting the reason for our predictive failures. We note, using the
1963 valuation equation as an example, that the percentage degree of
under- or overpricing is not highly correlated with subsequent returns,
the coefficient of determination being only 0.06. It is possible to isolate
four reasons for our lack of forecasting success.
1. The first reason is that the valuation relationship changes over time.
We might be unable to select truly underpriced securities because by the
next year the norms of valuation have been significantly altered. Thus
what was cheap on the basis of the 1963 relationship may no longer
represent good value on the basis of the 1964 equation. To test how
important this change might be, we performed the following experiment:
We assumed that investors knew at the end of 1963 exactly what the
Table 4.11 Analysis of Lack of Forecasting Success
Year Description r
2*
1963 Valuation equation with 1963 predictions .06
1964 Valuation equation with 1963 data (assumes next .10
year's valuation relationship is known)
1963 Valuation equation with realized growth rates .14
(assumes perfect foresight regarding future long-
term growth and next year's earnings)
1963 Valuation equation with 1964 predictions (assumes .27
perfect foresight regarding market expectations next
year)
* Percent residuals versus 1964 return.161 Empirical Connection of Growth Forecasts with Share-Valuation
market valuation relationship would be for the end of 1964; that is, we
assumed perfect foresight regarding next year's valuation equation.
Then, on the basis of the 1964 valuation equation, we used the 1963 data
to calculate warranted PINE multiples, which could then be compared
with actual multiples to determine whether each security was approp-
riately priced. Correlating the percentage residuals with subsequent re-
turns, we found that the coefficient of determination nearly doubled, 10
percent of the variance in subsequent returns now being explained.
2. A second reason for lack of success might be the quality of the
expectations data employed. As indicated in chapter 2, the growth-rate
forecasts used in the present study were not accurate predictors of real-
ized growth. To determine how much better off we would have been with
more accurate forecasts, we assumed perfect foresight regarding the
future long-term growth rate of the company. Thus the 1963 empirical
valuation equation was used to determine "normal" value, but in place of
gp we substituted the realized long-term growth rate through 1968. Using
these realized data to determine warranted price-earnings multiples, we
correlated the percentage residuals therefrom with future returns. As
expected, an even greater improvement in forecasting future returns was
found. The r
2 rises to 0.14.
3. As a further experiment, perfect foresight was assumed not about
the actual rate of growth of earnings but rather regarding what the market
expectations of growth would be next year, that is, about gp next year.
Calculating the degree of overpricing as before, we find a much greater
improvement in prediction of future returns. Twenty-seven percent of
the variability of future returns is now explained, compared with only 6
percent in the original experiment. We conclude that if one wants to
explain returns over a one-year horizon, it is far more important to know
what the market will think the growth rate of earnings will be next year
rather than to know the realized long-term growth rate. This observation
brings us back to Keynes's celebrated newspaper contest. What matters is
not one's personal criteria of beauty but what the average opinion will
expect average opinion to think is beautiful at the close of the contest.
4. A final source of error is that the valuation model does not capture
all the significant determinants of value for each individual company.
Despite our success in accounting for approximately three-quarters of the
variance in market price-earnings multiples, there are likely to be special
features applicable to many individual companies that cannot be cap-
tured quantitatively. For example, it turned out that the stock of many
tobacco companies always appeared to be underpriced. The reason for
this is not difficult to conjecture. There is a risk of government sanctions
against the tobacco industry that weighs heavily in the minds of investors,
but that is not related to the risk measures we have employed. Such an
explanation is not at variance with the underlying approach to risk162 Chapter Four
valuation that we have been using. The common susceptibility of the
tobacco companies to an identifiable but ignored hazard is simply an
important factor which we have omitted from our data.
This problem of omitted variables may account for the correlations of
residuals which we found in the equations. If certain factors specific to
individual companies were consistently missing, the residuals from the
valuation equations could be expected to be positively correlated over
time. This is exactly what we found in table 4.10. Thus, despite our
success in using expectations data to estimate a valuation equation which
has far more explanatory ability than those based on historic information,
it is still quite clear that certain systematic valuation factors are missing
from the analysis. Consequently, it cannot be said that all deviations of
actual from predicted price-earnings ratios are simply manifestations of
temporary over- or underpricing.
4.6 Conclusion
Our investigations of valuation models, while not without some ambig-
uous results, suggest several notable conclusions. These conclusions con-
cern the role in market valuation of the sort of earnings forecasts we have
collected, the nature of risk valuation, and the efficiency of the market.
4.6.1 Valuation of Expected Growth
One of our major findings is that the average of the expected long-term
growth rates, together with the risk measure provided by the variance of
the growth-rate predictions, gives a closer account of the valuation of
common stocks than do alternatives. These growth rates were clearly
superior in accounting for prices to any of the simple alternatives we
considered. More closely fitting equations are the results that one would
expect from smaller errors of measurement or from using data that
contain more relevant information in place of less germane measures.
Hence one can safely presume that our data are more similar to the
expectations being valued in the market than are measures based on ex
post realized growth or regression coefficients. This conclusion, based on
the ability to "explain" prices, is buttressed by noticing that the overall
risk-free expected rates of return suggested by the estimates of the
expected return regressions are of plausible orders of magnitude.
The finding that prices reflect expected growth occurred in spite of the
difficulties we encountered from the large variations in which companies
were covered by each of the various predictors. Earlier we saw that there
is a great deal of diversity of expectations among forecasters, an aspect of
reality with which valuation models do not usually cope. We also found
that, while hardly being strong predictions, the expectations data appear
to yield forecasts at least as accurate as, and often better than, naive
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could not calculate a linear combination of different types of forecasts
whose superior forecasting performance continued over time.
Efficient market hypotheses suggest that valuation should reflect the
information available to investors. Insofar as analysts' forecasts are more
precise than other types we should therefore expect their differences
from other measures to be reflected in the market. It is therefore note-
worthy that our regression results do support the hypothesis that analysts'
forecasts are needed even when calculated growth rates are available. As
we noted when we described the data, security analysts do not use simple
mechanical methods to obtain their evaluations of companies. The
growth-rate figures we obtained were distilled from careful examination
of all aspects of the companies' records, evaluation of contingencies to
which they might be subject, and whatever information about their
prospects the analysts could glean from the companies themselves or
from other sources. It is therefore notable that the results of their efforts
are found to be so much more relevant to the valuation than the various
simpler and more "objective" alternatives that we tried.
We saw in section 3.2.3 that diversity of expectations together with
market imperfections might invalidate the valuation model. However,
we also argued that there were theoretical grounds for supposing that the
model would still hold for the average of investors' expectations. It is
therefore of particular interest that our empirical results do support the
hypothesis that prices reflect average expectations.
It is no surprise that we found roles for both short- and long-term
expected rates of growth. Models of valuation using only long-term
growth rates are clearly only simplifications of the more complicated
processes that earnings and dividends follow over time, and we would
expect market valuation to reflect the more complicated processes.
4.6.2 Risk Measures and Valuation
The results did not provide wholly unambiguous support for the spe-
cific valuation models developed here. A number of aspects of our results
about risk are particularly intriguing. It is clear from our results that
expected returns do seem to be related to various systematic risk factors.
Equally clearly, our results do not give straightforward support to the
simple form of the CAPM. It would appear that systematic risk is not
entirely captured by single measures of covariance with the market index.
This has important implications for those who attempt to use the modern
investment technology in practical problems of portfolio selection. One
such suggestion, which had attracted a considerable following in the
investment community by the 1980s, was the proposal for a yield-tilted
index fund.
The reasoning behind the yield-tilted index fund seems appealingly
plausible. Since dividends are generally taxed more highly than capital
gains and since the market equilibrium is presumably achieved on the164 Chapter Four
basis of after-tax returns, the equilibrium pretax returns for stocks that
pay high dividends ought to be higher than for securities that produce
lower dividends and correspondingly higher capital gains. Hence the
tax-exempt investor is advised to buy a diversified portfolio of high-
dividend-paying stocks. In order to avoid the assumption of any greater
risk than is involved in buying the market index, the tax-exempt investor
is also advised to purchase a yield-tilted index fund, that is, a very broadly
diversified portfolio of high-dividend-paying stocks that mirrors the mar-
ket index in the sense that it has a beta coefficient $M precisely equal to
unity.
Even on a priori grounds one might question the logic of the yield-tilted
index fund. Many of the largest investors in the market are tax-exempt
(such as pension and endowment funds) and others (such as corpora-
tions) actually pay a lower tax on capital gains than on dividend income.
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Thus it is far from clear that the marginal investor in the stock market
prefers to receive income through capital gains rather than through
dividend payments. Our theoretical arguments in chapter 3 also indicated
that great care must be taken with arguments involving "marginal"
investors and pointed out that the diversification theory gives no pre-
sumption that dividends and capital gains will be valued differently. But
apart from these a priori arguments, our empirical results can be inter-
preted as providing another argument against the yield-tilted index fund.
If the traditional beta calculation (pM) does not provide a full descrip-
tion of systematic risk, the yield-tilted index fund may well fail to mirror
the market index. Specifically, during periods when inflation and interest
rates rise, it may well be the case that high-dividend stocks are particu-
larly vulnerable; that is, they have high 8P and br coefficients. Public-util-
ity common stocks are a good example. While they are known as "low-
beta" stocks, they are likely to have high systematic risk with respect to
interest rates and inflation. This is so not only because they are good
substitutes for fixed-income securities, but also because public utilities
are vulnerable to a profits squeeze during periods of rising inflation
because of regulatory lags and increased borrowing costs. Hence the
yield-tilted index fund with 3M = 1 may not mirror the market index
when inflation accelerates.
The actual experience of yield-tilted index funds during the 1979-80
period shows that these funds did not live up to expectations and their
performance was significantly worse than the market. Of course, we
should not reject a model simply because of its failure over any specific
short-term period. Nevertheless, we believe that an understanding of the
wider aspects of systematic risk, such as those analyzed here, would have
12. For corporate investors, 85 percent of dividend income is excluded from taxable
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helped prevent what turned out to be (at least over the short term) some
serious investment errors.
Our findings on systematic risk still leave some major and intriguing
perplexities. We found in both versions of the valuation model that the
most important aspect of risk for valuation was that represented by the
extent to which forecasters were not in agreement about the future
growth of the company. Exactly what is the basis for this finding is not
clear.
It might be quite reasonable to interpret s^ as representing specific risk.
In that case, the findings go against most recent models of valuation
including both the CAPM and the APT. On the other hand, it may
indirectly measure sensitivity to underlying common factors and thus
serve as a very effective proxy for a variety of systematic risks. Finally, it
may arise from technical difficulties having to do with undetected biases
in our data. It seems unlikely that this would fully account for the strength
we found for this variable, but it cannot be ruled out. Further investiga-
tion probably requires a data set less beset by problems of missing
observations and an adequately specified model of earnings. Overall, our
results do suggest that risk undoubtedly has dimensions not fully captured
by the covariances with market indexes or other variables that have
dominated recent work on valuation. They also suggest that the variance
of analysts' forecasts may represent the most effective risk proxy avail-
able.
4.6.3 Efficient Markets
We find it encouraging that we were unable to use the expectations
data to select securities with subsequent above- or below-average per-
formance characteristics. We would not expect that analysts' forecasts
would be sounder than those apparently used by the market or that they
would be irrelevant to market valuations. Apparently, the expectations
formed by Wall Street professionals get quickly and thoroughly im-
pounded into the prices of securities. Implicitly, we have found that the
evaluations of companies that analysts make are the sorts of ones on
which market valuation is based. Thus, while our work raises questions
about some currently popular valuation theories, it strongly supports the
view that the market is reasonably efficient in incorporating into present
prices whatever information there is about the future.